We study a mechanism design problem where an indivisible good is auctioned to multiple bidders, for each of whom it has a private value that is unknown to the seller and the other bidders. The agents perceive the ensemble of all bidder values as a random vector governed by an ambiguous probability distribution, which belongs to a commonly known ambiguity set. The seller aims to design a revenue maximizing mechanism that is not only immunized against the ambiguity of the bidder values but also against the uncertainty about the bidders attitude towards ambiguity. We argue that the seller achieves this goal by maximizing the worst-case expected revenue across all value distributions in the ambiguity set and by positing that the bidders have Knightian preferences. For ambiguity sets containing all distributions supported on a rectangle, we show that the optimal mechanism is a second price auction that is both efficient and displays a powerful Pareto dominance property. If the bidders values are additionally known to be independent, then the revenue of the (unknown) optimal mechanism does not exceed that of a second price auction with only one additional bidder. For ambiguity sets under which the bidders values are dependent and characterized through moment bounds, on the other hand, we provide a new class of randomized mechanisms, the highest-bidder-lotteries, whose revenues cannot be matched by any second price auction with a constant number of additional bidders.
Introduction
When traders from the Ottoman Empire first brought tulip bulbs to Holland in the seventeenth century, the combination of a limited supply and a rapidly increasing popularity led to highly non-stationary and volatile prices. Faced with the challenge of selling scarce items with a largely unknown demand, the flower exchange invented the Dutch auction, in which an artificially high asking price is gradually decreased until the first participant is willing to accept the trade. Nowadays, auctions are routinely used in economic transactions that are characterized by demand uncertainty, ranging from the sale of financial instruments (e.g., U.S. Treasury bills), antiques, collectibles and commodities (e.g., radio spectra, electricity and carbon emissions) to livestock and holidays.
Despite their long history, the scientific study of auctions only started in the sixties of the last century when the then emerging discipline of mechanism design began to model auctions as incomplete information games between rational but self-interested agents. In the most basic such game, a seller wishes to auction a single product to multiple bidders. Each bidder is fully aware of the value that he attaches to the good, whereas the other bidders and the seller only know the probability distribution from which this value has been drawn. This information structure is referred to as the private value setting. The seller aims to design a mechanism that allocates the good and charges the bidders based on a single-shot or iterative bidding process so as to maximize her expected revenues (optimal mechanism design), sometimes under the additional constraint that the resulting allocation should maximize the overall welfare (efficient mechanism design).
The bidders, in turn, seek to submit bids that maximize their expected utility arising from the difference of the value obtained from receiving the good (if they do so) and the charges incurred.
In the private value setting outlined above, the bidders' values for the good are typically modeled as independent random variables. Under this assumption, Vickrey (1961) argues that the second price auction without reserve price, which allocates the good to the highest bidder and charges him the value of the second highest bid, generates maximum revenues among all efficient mechanisms. Myerson (1981) proves that in the same setting, the second price auction maximizes the seller's revenues if it is augmented with a suitable reserve price. In this case, however, efficiency is typically lost since the good resides with the seller whenever the highest bid falls short of the reserve price. Cremer and McLean (1988) show that if the bidders' values are described by correlated random variables, then second price auctions no longer maximize the seller's revenues, and the seller can extract all surplus by combining an auction with a menu of side bets with the bidders. For a review of the mechanism design literature, we refer to Klemperer (1999) and Krishna (2009) 
Traditionally, the mechanism design literature models the bidders' values as a random vector that is governed by a probability distribution which is known precisely by all participants. Although this assumption greatly facilitates the analysis, the existence and common knowledge of such a distribution may be difficult to justify in settings where the demand is poorly understood, which arguably form the auctions' raison d'être. The literature on robust mechanism design addresses this concern by assuming that the bidders' willingness to pay is only known to be governed by some probability distribution from within an ambiguity set. In this setting, the agents take decisions that maximize their expected utility under the most adverse value distribution in the ambiguity set.
The early literature on robust mechanism design has studied the impact of ambiguity on traditional auction schemes. Salo and Weber (1995) show that the experimentally observed deviations from the theoretically optimal bidding strategy in a first price auction can be explained by the presence of ambiguity as well as ambiguity averse decision-making on behalf of the agents. In a similar study, Chen et al. (2007) show that the presence of ambiguity leads to lower bids in first price auctions. Lo (1998) and Ozdenoren (2002) derive the optimal bidding strategy for an ambiguity averse bidder in a first price auction, and they show that in contrast to the traditional theory, first price and second price auctions yield different revenues in the presence of ambiguity.
More recently, the robust mechanism design literature has focused on characterizing revenue maximizing auctions for different variants of the mechanism design problem under ambiguity. Bose et al. (2006) show that full insurance mechanisms, which either make the seller or the bidders indifferent between the possible bids of the (other) bidders, maximize the seller's worst-case revenues in several variants of the optimal auction design problem under ambiguity. Bodoh-Creed (2012) generalizes a well-known payoff equivalence result to ambiguous auctions, and he uses it to provide further intuition about the optimality of full insurance mechanisms. Bose and Daripa (2009) show that for certain classes of -contamination ambiguity sets, the seller can extract almost all surplus by a variant of the Dutch auction. Bose et al. (2006) , Bose and Daripa (2009) and Bodoh-Creed (2012) all model the bidders' values as independent random variables, and they assume that the agents exhibit maxmin preferences, that is, the agents judge actions in view of their expected utility under the worst probability distribution in the ambiguity set. In contrast, Lopomo et al. (2014) consider agents that exhibit Knightian preferences, that is, an action A is preferred over an action B only if A yields a weakly higher expected utility than B under every probability distribution in the ambiguity set. They derive necessary and sufficient conditions for full surplus extraction under ambiguity in a mechanism design problem where a principal interacts with a single agent. Bandi and Bertsimas (2014) point out that the mechanism design problem is amenable to a formulation as a robust optimization problem (Ben-Tal et al. 2009 , Bertsimas et al. 2011 . To this end, they model the bidders' values as a deterministic vector that is chosen adversely from an uncertainty set. They show that in this setting, the second price auction with item and bidder dependent reserve prices is optimal Ç agıl Koçyigit, Garud Iyengar, Daniel Kuhn, Wolfram Wiesemann for multi-item auctions with budget constrained buyers. They also show that the optimal reserve prices can be calculated through an optimization problem.
In this paper, we study the single-item auction design problem under ambiguity, where we follow the approach of Lopomo et al. (2014) and assume that the agents exhibit Knightian preferences. We show that this assumption not only protects the seller against the ambiguity of the bidders' values, but it also immunizes her against the bidders' attitude towards this ambiguity. In analogy to Bandi and Bertsimas (2014) , we then argue that the resulting mechanism design problem under ambiguity is amenable to a formulation as a distributionally robust optimization problem Ye 2010, Wiesemann et al. 2014) . We use this insight to study three popular classes of ambiguity sets:
(i) support-only ambiguity sets containing all distributions supported on a pre-specified set, (ii) independence ambiguity sets comprising only symmetric and regular distributions under which the bidder values are independent, and (iii) Markov ambiguity sets containing all distributions that are supported on a pre-specified set and satisfy a first-order moment constraint.
The contributions of this paper to the three classes of ambiguity sets are summarized below.
1. For support-only ambiguity sets, we specify the best second price auction with reserve price, and we show that this auction maximizes the worst-case expected revenues over all (efficient and inefficient) mechanisms. Moreover, we show that this auction exhibits a powerful Pareto dominance property. Indeed, among all efficient mechanisms the second price auction with reserve price generates the highest revenues under every possible realization of the bidders' values.
2. For independence ambiguity sets, we prove that a second price auction with reserve price generates the highest worst-case expected revenue among all efficient (but not necessarily inefficient) mechanisms. We also show that the added value of the (to date unknown) optimal mechanism over the second price auction without reserve price is offset by attracting just one additional bidder.
3. For Markov ambiguity sets, we specify the best second price auction with reserve price, and we show that this auction asymptotically maximizes the worst-case expected seller revenues as the number of bidders grows. We also propose a new class of auctions-the highest-bidder-lotteries-in which the seller offers the highest bidder a lottery that determines the allocation of the good as well as the payment. We analytically determine the best highest-bidder-lottery, and we show that it can generate significantly higher revenues than the best second price auction with reserve price.
We also prove that its revenues cannot be matched by any second price auction with a constant number of additional bidders.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 defines the auction design problem of interest, it establishes preliminary results required in the remainder of the paper, and it shows that the assumption of Knightian preferences insures the seller against both the ambiguity in the bidders' values as well as their attitude towards this ambiguity. Sections 3, 4 and 5 study the auction design problem for support-only, independence and Markov ambiguity sets, respectively.
For the sake of readability, lengthy and technical proofs are deferred to the appendix.
Notation. For any v ∈ R I we denote by v i its i th component and by v −i = (v 1 , . . . , v i−1 , v i+1 , . . . , v I ) its subvector excluding v i . The vector of ones is denoted by e. Random variables are designated by tilde signs (e.g.,ṽ) and their realizations by the same symbols without tildes (e.g., v). For any Borel set V ∈ B(R I ) we use P 0 (V) to represent the set of all probability distributions on V. The family of all bounded Borel-measurable functions from V ∈ B(R I ) to
, which are not welldefined because conditional expectations under P are only defined up to sets of P-measure zero,
The latter statement is well-defined but cumbersome.
Problem Formulation and Preliminaries
We consider the following mechanism design problem. A seller aims to sell an indivisible good which is of zero value to her. There are I potential buyers (or bidders) indexed by i ∈ I = {1, . . . , I}. The buyers' values for the good are modeled as a random vectorṽ that follows a probability distribution P 0 in some ambiguity set P ⊆ P 0 (R I + ). We denote the realizations ofṽ by v and refer to them as scenarios. The probability distribution P 0 is unknown to the agents, but the ambiguity set P is common knowledge. We denote by V the smallest closed set that has probability 1 under every distribution P ∈ P, and by V i the marginal projection of V onto the i-th coordinate axis. Following the standard assumption in the mechanism design literature, we assume that
The seller aims to determine a mechanism for selling the good. A mechanism (B 1 , . . . , B I , q, m) Example 1 (First Price Sealed Bid Auction). The first price sealed bid auction is a widely used mechanism, where bidders simultaneously report their bids b i ∈ B i = R + , i ∈ I. The highest bidder wins the good with probability 1 and pays an amount equal to his bid, whereas all other bidders win the good with probability 0 and do not make a payment. If there is a tie (the highest bidder is not unique), then the winner is determined at random (or by some other tie-breaking rule).
We assume that all agents are risk-neutral with respect to the uncertainty of the allocation.
Ç agıl Koçyigit, Garud Iyengar, Daniel Kuhn, Wolfram Wiesemann Definition 1 (Ex-post Utility). The ex-post utility of bidder i with value v i and reporting message b i is defined as
where b −i denotes the vector of messages reported by the other bidders.
The ex-post utility of a bidder quantifies his expected payoff after all messages are revealed. Note that the ex-post utility depends critically on the allocation and payment rules of the mechanism at hand. We will suppress this dependence notationally, however, in order to avoid clutter.
We assume that the buyers have incomplete preferences as in Knightian decision theory, see, e.g., Knight (1921) and Bewley (2002) . In this setting, a buyer prefers an action to another one if it results in a higher expected utility to him under every distribution P ∈ P.
Given a mechanism, the buyers play a game of incomplete information and select their bids strategically to induce the most desirable outcome in view of their individual preferences. Recall that buyer i selects a message depending on his value v i . Thus, his strategy must be modeled as a function β i : V i → B i that maps each of his possible values to a message. An I-tuple of strategies β = (β 1 , . . . , β I ) constitutes an equilibrium for a given mechanism if no agent i has an incentive to unilaterally change his strategy β i .
Definition 2 (Knightian Nash Equilibrium). An I-tuple of strategies β i :
constitutes a Knightian Nash equilibrium for a mechanism (B 1 , . . . , B I , q, m) if
In the absence of ambiguity, that is, for P = {P 0 }, a Knightian Nash equilibrium collapses to a Bayesian Nash equilibrium as introduced by Harsanyi (1967) . If P = P 0 (V), on the other hand, then the Knightian Nash equilibrium reduces to an ex-post Nash equilibrium (Fudenberg and Tirole 1991, Section 1.2) . Note also that every ex-post Nash equilibrium is automatically a Knightian Nash equilibrium, but the converse implication is generally wrong.
The mechanism design problem is the decision problem of the seller. We assume that the seller is ambiguity averse in the sense that she aims to maximize the worst-case expected revenue in view of all distributions P ∈ P. However, she may not know how ambiguity is perceived by the bidders and may wish to hedge against uncertainty in the buyers' preferences. We will argue later that this is achieved by adopting the view that the buyers have Knightian preferences, which in a sense represent the worst-case buyer preferences from the seller's perspective. Hence, the seller is interested in selecting allocation and payment rules that maximize her worst-case expected revenue, anticipating that the buyers' strategies will be in a Knightian Nash equilibrium. Note that a mechanism is of interest only if it has a Knightian Nash equilibrium because, otherwise, its outcome is unpredictable.
We assume that bidder i with value v i ∈ V i will walk away from a mechanism if his expected utility under a Knightian Nash equilibrium is negative for some P ∈ P. Without loss of generality, the seller thus only considers mechanisms that attract all buyers. Indeed, imagine that bidder i with value v i prefers to walk away under the mechanism (q, m). The same outcome is achieved
ex-post utility of zero to him so that participating remains weakly dominant.
The set of all mechanisms is extremely large. An important subset is the family of direct mechanisms in which the set of messages available to buyer i is equal to the set of his values, that is,
Yet a smaller subset is the family of truthful direct mechanisms, in which it is optimal for each buyer to report his true value. In fact, due to the celebrated revelation principle by Myerson (1981) , we can restrict attention to truthful direct mechanisms without loss of generality.
Theorem 1 (The Revelation Principle). Given any mechanism (B 1 , . . . , B I , q, m) with a corresponding Knightian Nash equilibrium β i : V i → B i , i ∈ I, there exists a truthful direct mechanism resulting in the same ex-post utilities for the bidders and the same ex-post revenue for the seller for every v ∈ V.
The proof is a straightforward adaptation of the proof of Proposition 5.1 in Krishna (2009) .
The intuition is as follows. Consider any mechanism (B 1 , . . . , B I , q, m) as well as an equilibrium β for this mechanism. Then, the seller can construct an equivalent truthful direct mechanism (V 1 , . . . , V I , q , m ) as follows. The seller can simply ask the bidders to report their true values, allocate the good according to the rule q (v) = q(β(v)) and charge payments m (v) = m(β(v))
as if the bidders had implemented their equilibrium strategies for the original mechanism. In this case, the bidders have no incentive to misreport their true values because truthful bidding is the equilibrium strategy for the new mechanism by construction. Also, the ex-post revenue of the seller and the ex-post utilities of the bidders do not change.
From now on, we focus exclusively on truthful direct mechanisms and use the shorthand (q, m)
to denote (V 1 , . . . , V I , q, m) because the set of messages available to each buyer is always equal to the interval of his possible values. A direct mechanism is truthful under Knightian preferences if and only if it is distributionally robust incentive compatible.
Definition 3 (Distributionally Robust Incentive Compatibility). Koçyigit, Garud Iyengar, Daniel Kuhn, Wolfram Wiesemann Distributionally robust incentive compatibility ensures that reporting the true value v i ∈ V i is a dominant strategy for bidder i under Knightian preferences.
Recall that the seller is only interested in mechanisms that attract all bidders. If the bidders are willing to participate in a given mechanism, the corresponding truthful direct mechanism will be distributionally robust individually rational.
Definition 4 (Distributionally Robust Individual Rationality). A mechanism (q, m) is called distributionally robust individually rational if
Distributionally robust individual rationality ensures that the expected utility of bidder i conditional on his own value v i is non-negative under truthful bidding for any possible value v i ∈ V i and any possible probability distribution P ∈ P.
We can now formalize the seller's problem of finding the best truthful direct mechanism as
where Sometimes we will further restrict problem (MDP) to optimize only over efficient mechanisms.
Definition 5 (Efficiency). A mechanism (q, m) is called efficient if q ∈ Q eff , where
An efficient mechanism allocates the good with probability 1 to a bidder who values it most.
Hence, it maximizes the ex-post total social welfare across all agents (seller and bidders), which coincides with the highest bidder value because the payments of the bidders and the revenue of the seller cancel each other. Recall that the good has zero value to the seller. Allocative efficiency plays a crucial role in the sale of public goods such as railway lines, plots of public land or specific bands of the electromagnetic spectrum. Efficient allocations do not normally emerge from mechanisms with inefficient allocation rules, even if we allow for the existence of an aftermarket with zero transaction costs (Krishna 2009, Section 1.4) .
We will now demonstrate that distributionally robust incentive compatible mechanisms protect the seller against uncertainty in the bidders' attitude towards ambiguity. Indeed, depending on the bidders' preferences, one can envisage other types of incentive compatibility.
(iv) Bayesian incentive compatible with respect to a Borel distribution Q on P (where P is equipped with its weak topology) if for all
whereP ∼ Q is a random value distribution.
One can define individual rationality with respect to other preferences analogously.
Proposition 1. Ex-post incentive compatibility implies distributionally robust incentive compatibility, whereas distributionally robust incentive compatibility implies maxmin incentive compatibility, Hurwicz incentive compatibility and Bayesian incentive compatibility.
Proof. It is easy to verify that ex-post incentive compatibility implies distributionally robust incentive compatibility.
For any fixed i ∈ I and v i , w i ∈ V i , distributionally robust incentive compatibility requires that
Since (1) holds for all P ∈ P, we have
Now, taking the infimum over P ∈ P on the left-hand side yields
Ç agıl Koçyigit, Garud Iyengar, Daniel Kuhn, Wolfram Wiesemann This establishes maxmin incentive compatibility.
Note that (1) implies
Since this condition holds for all P ∈ P, we can take the supremum over P ∈ P on the right-hand side to obtain
Summing α times (2) and 1 − α times (3) for any α ∈ (0, 1) yields Hurwicz incentive compatibility.
By taking expectations on both sides of (1) with respect to the distribution Q on P, finally, it is immediate to show that Bayesian incentive compatibility holds.
Using similar arguments as in Proposition 1, one can verify that ex-post individual rationality implies distributionally robust individual rationality, and that distributionally robust individual rationality implies maxmin, Hurwicz and Bayesian individual rationality. Thus, agents have no incentive to walk away from a distributionally robust individually rational mechanism or to misreport their values in a distributionally robust incentive compatible mechanism even if they have maxmin, Bayesian or Hurwicz preferences. Hence, adopting a distributionally robust perspective allows the seller to hedge against uncertainty about the bidders' attitude towards ambiguity. Use of ex-post individual rationality and incentive compatibility would provide even stronger protection against uncertainty in the bidders' preferences, but it would also lead to more conservative mechanisms that do not benefit from any distributional information that might be available.
So far, the literature on mechanism design has used almost exclusively the maxmin criterion to model the ambiguity aversion of the bidders. However, while being less conservative, the resulting mechanism design problems may fail to protect against the uncertainty about the bidders' attitude towards ambiguity.
Example 2. Consider the ambiguity set P = {P 1 , P 2 } with V = {0, 2} × {1, 4}. The probabilities of the four scenarios under P 1 and P 2 are given in the following table.
v (0, 1) (0, 4) (2, 1) (2, 4) We consider an all-pay mechanism where the highest bidder wins, and every bidder pays half of his bid (irrespective of whether the bid was successful or not). Note that the highest bidder is Distributionally Robust Mechanism Design Ç agıl Koçyigit, Garud Iyengar, Daniel Kuhn, Wolfram Wiesemann 11 always unique in this example. One can verify that this mechanism is maxmin incentive compatible over P. Below we list the expected utilities of bidder 2 with true value 4 with respect to P 1 and P 2 when he reports values 4 and 1, respectively.
Hence, we have
that is, the all-pay mechanism is not distributionally robust incentive compatible.
For α = 1/2, Hurwicz incentive compatibility is violated because
The above inequality is also in conflict with Bayesian incentive compatibility if we set Q(P 1 ) = Q(P 2 ) = 1/2. In the following sections, we will investigate the optimal mechanisms, which maximize the worstcase expected revenues without any restrictions on the allocation rule, and the best efficient mechanisms, which maximize only over efficient allocation rules, for different classes of ambiguity sets P.
Before that, we review and extend some important results from the literature that will be used throughout the paper.
The Revenue Equivalence
We first review a cornerstone result from the mechanism design literature stating that the payment rule of an ex-post incentive compatible mechanism is uniquely determined by the allocation rule up to an additive constant for each bidder. In addition, we derive a related result for distributionally robust incentive compatible mechanisms. When applicable, these results will help us to simplify problem (MDP) by substituting out the payment rule. For ease of exposition, we will henceforth
We first define monotonicity of allocation rules.
Definition 7 (Monotone Allocation Rule). An allocation rule is called (i) ex-post monotone if it belongs to the set
(ii) distributionally robust monotone if it belongs to the set
Ex-post monotonicity implies that bidder i's probability to win the good is non-decreasing in his
On the other hand, distributionally robust monotonicity ensures that the expected allocation to bidder i is non-decreasing in v i under all distributions P ∈ P.
Some results below will rely on the assumption that the bidders' values are independent.
Definition 8 (Independence). We say that the bidders' values are independent if the random variablesṽ i , i ∈ I, are mutually independent under every P ∈ P.
From now on, we use the shorthand
truthful bidding. The next proposition shows that the actual (expected) payment of each bidder under an ex-post (distributionally robust) incentive compatible mechanism is completely determined by the allocation rule and the ex-post (expected) utility of the bidder under his lowest value.
The proof of this result is relegated to the appendix. 
(ii) If the bidders' values are independent, then a mechanism (q, m) is distributionally robust incentive compatible if and only if q ∈ Q m-d and
Proof. Proof of both assertions widely parallels to the presentation in Krishna (2009, Section 5.1.2) and is thus omitted.
Note that (4) can be viewed as a special case of (5) corresponding to the ambiguity set P = P 0 (V). Proposition 2 is the main ingredient for the following generalized revenue equivalence theorem, which is an extension of the revenue equivalence theorem by Myerson (1981) and Riley and Samuelson (1981) . The proof of this result is relegated to the appendix.
Theorem 2 (The Revenue Equivalence). If the bidders' values are independent, then all distributionally robust individually rational and incentive compatible mechanisms with the same allocation rule q, for which the ex-post utility of each bidder under his lowest value is 0, result in the same worst-case expected revenue for the seller.
The revenue equivalence theorem naturally extends to all indirect mechanisms by virtue of the revelation principle (see Theorem 1). Note that the assertion (ii) of Proposition 2 ceases to hold if the bidders' values are dependent, even if the ambiguity set is a singleton, which implies that the revenue equivalence breaks down (Milgrom and Weber 1982) .
Second Price Auctions with Reserve Prices
The most widely used incentive compatible mechanisms are the second price auctions with reserve prices. From now on, we let V i , i ∈ I, be any partition of V, where V i contains all scenarios v for which i is the unique highest bidder. If the highest bidder is not unique, then we use an arbitrary tie-breaker (e.g., the lexicographic tie-breaker assigns v to V i if and only if i = min arg max j∈I v j ).
Definition 9 (Second Price Auction with Reserve Price). A mechanism (q sp , m sp ) is called a second price auction with a reserve price r if ∀i ∈ I, ∀v ∈ V,
0 otherwise, and
The allocation rule q sp depends on the tie-breaker that was used in the definition of the sets V i , i ∈ I. Our subsequent results will not depend on the particular choice of the tie-breaker. Intuitively, in a second price auction with a reserve price, the good is allocated to the highest bidder provided that his value exceeds the reserve price r, and the winner pays an amount equal to the maximum of A second price auction with a reserve price is not necessarily efficient. Indeed, the seller may keep the object for herself if the highest bid falls short of the reserve price. The Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism is an instance of an efficient second price auction with a reserve price.
Definition 10 (Vickrey-Clarke-Groves Mechanism). The Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism is the mechanism (q vcg , m vcg ) that satisfies, ∀i ∈ I, ∀v ∈ V,
In the VCG mechanism, the highest bidder receives the good (using any tie-breaker rule), and he pays the difference between (1) the total social welfare that would emerge if his value was reduced to v i (while all other bidders' values remain unchanged) and (2) the social welfare of all other bidders if all values are kept constant at v.
Next, we provide a more practical characterization of the VCG mechanism.
Proposition 3. The VCG mechanism is equivalent to the second price auction with reserve
Proof. The second equality in the definition of r vcg is due to the rectangularity of V. In the remainder of the proof, we denote by (q vcg , m vcg ) the VCG mechanism of Definition 10 and by (q sp , m sp ) the second price auction with reserve price r vcg . By construction, we have
Denote by q the common allocation rule. To prove that m vcg = m sp , select an arbitrary i ∈ I and v ∈ V.
Case 1 (v ∈ V i ): By the definition of second price auctions, we have q i (v i , v −i ) = 0 and thus
where the first equality follows from the definition of the VCG payment rule, and the second equality holds because (max
Here, the first equality follows from the definition of the VCG payment rule, the second equality
, the third equality follows from the definition of r vcg , and the fourth equality holds because
Note that if 0 ∈ V, then Proposition 3 reduces to the well-known result that the VCG mechanism simplifies to a second price auction without a reserve price (i.e., a second price auction with reserve price r = 0).
As the VCG mechanism is a special instance of a second price auction with reserve price, it is clear that it is ex-post individually rational and incentive compatible. We formalize this insight in the following proposition.
Corollary 1. The VCG mechanism is ex-post individually rational and incentive compatible.
Proof. Proposition 3 implies that the VCG mechanism is a second price auction with reserve price. The claim thus follows from Section 2.2 in Krishna (2009) . We illustrate the construction of the VCG reserve price r vcg in Figure 1 
Robust Mechanism Design
Assume that the seller and the bidders only know the support V of the values that are possible but have no information about their probabilities. In this case, the ambiguity set reduces to P = P 0 (V).
Proposition 4. If P = P 0 (V), then the optimal mechanism design problem (MDP) reduces to the robust optimization problem
The proof of Proposition 4 is elementary and therefore omitted. Note that, under a support-only ambiguity set, distributionally robust individual rationality and incentive compatibility reduce to ex-post individual rationality and incentive compatibility, respectively.
Next, we demonstrate that the robust mechanism design problem (RMDP) admits in fact an analytical solution.
Theorem 3. The VCG mechanism is optimal in (RMDP).
Proof. By Proposition 1, the VCG mechanism is feasible in (RMDP).
Next, we generate an upper bound on the optimal value of (RMDP). To this end, set v = (v 1 , . . . , v I ). Consider any mechanism (q, m) that is feasible in (RMDP). By ex-post individual rationality and because i∈I q i (v) ≤ 1, we have
which implies that no mechanism can generate higher revenues for the seller than max i∈I v i in the value realization v. Hence, max i∈I v i is an upper bound for the optimal value of (RMDP). Now, we show that the VCG mechanism attains this upper bound and is therefore optimal.
More specifically, we need to show that for any scenario v ∈ V, the revenues generated by the VCG mechanism are at least as high as max i∈I v i . To this end, fix any v ∈ V and i ∈ I such that v ∈ V i .
We then have
where the first equality follows from the definition of the VCG mechanism, and the last two equalities follow from Corollary 3. Hence, the worst-case revenue earned by the VCG mechanism is at least max i∈I v i . As no mechanism can generate higher worst-case revenues than max i∈I v i , the VCG mechanism is indeed optimal in (RMDP).
Theorem 3 implies that (RMDP) admits an optimal mechanism, the VCG mechanism, which is efficient even though efficiency was not imposed. This is unusual because in general there is a trade-off between revenues and efficiency (see, e.g., Krishna 2009, Section 2.5). We will next show that, besides being optimal in (RMDP), the VCG mechanism also displays a powerful Pareto dominance property.
Proposition 5. Among all ex-post individually rational and incentive compatible efficient mechanisms, the VCG mechanism generates the highest revenues in every fixed scenario v ∈ V.
Proof. Select any ex-post individually rational and incentive compatible efficient mechanism
for some fixed v ∈ V, and note that there exists i ∈ I with v ∈ V i . Then, we have
We will show that if the above strict inequality holds, then (q, m) cannot simultaneously satisfy ex-post individual rationality, ex-post incentive compatibility and efficiency.
If the second highest bid equals the highest bid v i , then we have
where the second inequality holds because j∈I q j (v) = 1. This contradicts ex-post individual rationality, which implies that
If there is no tie and
, where the first equality holds because the mechanism (q, m) is ex-post individually rational. Select
and V is a box. Then, the mechanism (q, m) violates ex-post incentive compatibility because
where the first inequality holds because
and V is a box. Hence, ex-post incentive compatibility is violated because
One can show that the Pareto dominance property of Proposition 5 ceases to hold if we compare the VCG mechanism against every ex-post individually rational and incentive compatible mechanism. Proposition 5 is reminiscent of the theory of Pareto optimality in robust optimization due to Iancu and Trichakis (2013) , which suggests that amongst all optimal solutions of a robust optimization problem one should favor those that display the best performance in some nominal scenario. Proposition 5 provides a stronger result in that it shows that among all efficient solutions to (RMDP) the VCG mechanism offers the highest revenues in every fixed scenario.
Mechanism Design under Independent Values
Throughout this section, we assume that the bidders' values are independent in the sense of Definition 8. Some results of this section will further require that each P ∈ P is symmetric and regular.
Definition 11 (Symmetry). A distribution P ∈ P 0 (V) is called symmetric if the random variablesṽ i , i ∈ I, share the same marginal distribution under P.
Definition 12 (Regularity). A distribution P ∈ P 0 (V) is called regular if the marginal density ρ P i (v i ) ofṽ i under P exists and is strictly positive for all v i ∈ V i , while the virtual valuation
Ç agıl Koçyigit, Garud Iyengar, Daniel Kuhn, Wolfram Wiesemann Independence, symmetry and regularity are standard assumptions of the benchmark model for auctions as defined by McAfee and McMillan (1987) . The virtual valuations can be interpreted as marginal revenues (see Krishna 2009, Section 5.2.3) . They were first introduced by Myerson (1981) in order to solve the optimal mechanism design problem in the absence of ambiguity. Note that a sufficient condition for regularity is that the hazard function
is non-decreasing in v i .
Proposition 6. If the bidders' values are independent, then the optimal mechanism design problem (MDP) reduces to
(IMDP)
Proof. By Proposition 2(ii), distributionally robust incentive compatibility is equivalent to the first constraint of (IMDP) and the requirement that q ∈ Q m-d . The first constraint in (IMDP) then implies that distributionally robust individual rationality simplifies to
where the equivalence holds because the integral in the first line is always non-negative.
To see that the objective function of (MDP) reduces to the objective function of (IMDP), we proceed as in the proof of Theorem 2. Details are omitted for brevity.
The next theorem shows that the VCG mechanism is the best efficient mechanism in (IMDP).
Theorem 4. The VCG mechanism generates the highest worst-case expected revenue in (IMDP) among all efficient mechanisms.
Proof. By Corollary 1, the VCG mechanism is ex-post individually rational and incentive compatible. Hence, by Proposition 1, it is also distributionally robust individually rational and incentive compatible. We conclude that the VCG mechanism is feasible in (MDP) and thus, by Proposition 6, in (IMDP).
We now show that the ex-post utility of each bidder i with value v i vanishes under the VCG mechanism. If bidder i with value v i does not win the good, then he does not have to make a payment, and his ex-post utility is zero. Otherwise, if he wins the good, then we have
where the first inequality follows from ex-post individual rationality, the second equality follows from Proposition 3, and the last equality follows from the definition of r vcg . Thus, the ex-post utility of each bidder i with value v i is always zero.
Next, we show that the VCG mechanism generates a weakly higher worst-case expected revenue than any other efficient mechanism (q , m ) ∈ Q eff × M that is feasible in (IMDP). Indeed, as the ex-post utility of each bidder i with value v i vanishes under the VCG mechanism, the objective value of the VCG mechanism in (IMDP) satisfies
Here, the first equality follows from efficiency, which implies that i∈I q i (v) = i∈I q i (v) = 1 and
while the inequality is due to the second constraint of (IMDP). The claim then follows because the last line of the above expression represents the objective function value of (q , m ) in (IMDP).
In order to examine the properties of the optimal (not necessarily efficient) mechanisms, we reformulate problem (IMDP) in terms of the virtual valuations introduced in Definition 12. The following proposition extends Lemma 3 by Myerson (1981) for non-ambiguous value distributions.
Its proof is relegated to the appendix.
Proposition 7. If the bidders' values are independent and each P ∈ P is regular, then problem (IMDP) is equivalent to
We now review a celebrated result by Myerson (1981) , which asserts that in the absence of ambiguity (P = {P}), a second price auction with a reserve price is optimal if the bidders' values are independent and the distribution P is symmetric and regular.
Theorem 5. (Myerson 1981) If P = {P}, the bidders' values are independent, and the distribution P is symmetric and regular, then the allocation rule
for all i ∈ I and v ∈ V, is optimal in (6) and generates expected revenues of
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One can show that the mechanism (q , m ) is optimal in (IMDP).
Note that if the virtual valuation ψ P 1 is continuous, then the optimal mechanism (q , m ) is the second price auction with reserve price r = inf{v 1 ∈ V 1 : ψ P 1 (v 1 ) ≥ 0}. Note also that this mechanism can be inefficient because ψ P 1 (v 1 ) can be negative. Koçyigit et al. (2017) show that second price auctions with reserve prices are generally suboptimal as soon as P contains two distributions even if the bidders' values are independent, and each P ∈ P is symmetric and regular. Unfortunately, we are unable to solve problem (6) analytically unless P is a singleton. As we will argue below, however, a simple second price auction without reserve price is almost optimal, implying that the added value of the unknown optimal mechanism is negligible.
In the absence of ambiguity, Bulow and Klemperer (1996) demonstrate that the second price auction without reserve price for I + 1 bidders yields higher expected revenues than the optimal auction for I bidders. In the non-ambiguous case, the optimal mechanism for I bidders is known to be a second price auction with a reserve price (see Theorem 5). The following theorem generalizes the result by Bulow and Klemperer (1996) to mechanism design problems under ambiguity even though the optimal mechanism remains unknown in this setting.
Theorem 6. Assume that the bidders' values are independent and that each distribution in the ambiguity set is symmetric and regular. Then, a second price auction without reserve price for I + 1 bidders yields a weakly higher worst-case expected revenue than an optimal auction for I bidders.
Proof. Throughout this proof, we write Q m-d I instead of Q m-d and P I instead of P in order to highlight the dependence on the number of bidders. Moreover, we denote by f I (q, P) the objective function value of an allocation rule q ∈ Q m-d I and distribution P ∈ P I in problem (6).
Select an arbitrary > 0. Assume first that the seller attracts I + 1 bidders, and denote by
I+1 the allocation rule of the second price auction without reserve price for I + 1 bidders. Then, there exists an -worst-case distribution P ∈ P I+1 such that
Denote by ρ P 1 the common marginal density function of the valuesṽ i under the distribution P , i ∈ I. Note that the virtual valuation ψ P 1 (v i ) is non-decreasing in v i because P ∈ P I+1 is regular. As second price auctions allocate the good to the highest bidder, Proposition 7 implies that
Next, we derive a lower bound on f I+1 (q sp , P ) by conditioning the above expectation separately on the events max i∈I ψ P 1 (ṽ i ) ≥ 0 and max i∈I ψ P 1 (ṽ i ) < 0. First, we have
Similarly, we find
where the inequality follows from interchanging the outer maximum with the conditional expectation. In the third line, we use the fact that E P [ψ P 1 (ṽ I+1 )] = 0, which can be verified through a direct calculation using integration by parts. By combining (9) and (10), we then obtain
Consider now the mechanism design problem with I bidders. There exists an -suboptimal allo-
Denote by P − the marginal distribution of (ṽ 1 , . . . ,ṽ I ) under P , and observe that P − ∈ P I because the bidders' values are independent and P is symmetric. Let q
be the allocation rule that maximizes expected revenues in problem (6) under the distribution P − . Note that this allocation rule exists due to Theorem 5. Thus, we have
Here, the first inequality holds by the construction of q , and the equality follows from the optimality of q P − for the given distribution P − . Hence,
where the first equality holds due to Theorem 5, the second equality follows from the definition of P − , and the inequalities follow from (11) and (8), respectively.
Since was chosen arbitrarily, the above implies that
and thus the claim follows.
Theorem 6 shows that the added value of the optimal mechanism over a simple second price auction without reserve price is offset by just attracting one additional bidder. Theorem 6 critically relies on the independence of the bidders' values, which facilitates the reformulation (6). In the next section, we will derive optimal mechanisms for situations where the bidders' values may be correlated. In this case, the added value of the optimal mechanism over even the best second price auction can be significant.
Mechanism Design under Moment Information
We now investigate settings where the bidders' values can be dependent. Specifically, we assume that the agents have information about some (generalized) moments of the value distribution. We thus consider moment ambiguity sets of the form
where ψ = (ψ 1 , . . . , ψ J ) represents a vector of generalized moment functions ψ j : V → R, and µ = (µ 1 , . . . , µ J ) denotes a vector of given moment bounds µ j ∈ R. The following non-restrictive technical condition will be assumed to hold throughout this section.
Assumption 1 (Slater Condition). There exists a Slater point P s ∈ P with E Ps [ψ(ṽ)] > µ.
The following proposition shows that if P is of the form (13), the bidders will require ex-post individual rationality and incentive compatibility.
Proposition 8. If P is a moment ambiguity set of the form (13) and Assumption 1 holds, then distributionally robust individual rationality and incentive compatibility simplify to ex-post individual rationality and incentive compatibility, respectively.
Proof. Select an arbitrary bidder i ∈ I with value v i ∈ V i , and note that the inequality
is trivially satisfied. To establish the converse inequality, we use Assumption 1, whereby there exists P s ∈ P with E Ps [ψ(ṽ)] > µ. By the RichterRogosinski theorem, we can assume without loss of generality that P s is discrete and representable Select now an arbitrary v −i ∈ V −i and set v = (v i , v −i ) as usual. As E Ps [ψ(ṽ)] > µ, there exists λ ∈ (0, 1) small enough such that the distribution P v −i = λδ v + (1 − λ) P s satisfies
where the inequality holds because P v −i ∈ P and the equality holds due to construction of P v −i . Since v −i was chosen arbitrarily, the above inequality holds for all
. Thus, distributionally robust individual rationality simplifies to ex-post individual rationality.
Using similar arguments, one can also prove the assertion about incentive compatibility. Details are omitted for brevity.
We now use the above proposition to simplify problem (MDP).
Proposition 9. If P is a moment ambiguity set of the form (13) and Assumption 1 holds, then the optimal mechanism design problem (MDP) reduces to
Proof. By Proposition 8, distributionally robust individual rationality and incentive compatibility simplify to ex-post individual rationality and incentive compatibility, respectively. By Proposition 2 (i), ex-post incentive compatibility is equivalent to the first constraint of (MMDP) and the requirement that q ∈ Q m-p . The reformulation of the objective function immediately follows from the first constraint in (MMDP). This constraint also implies that ex-post individual rationality simplifies to
Theorem 7. The VCG mechanism is a revenue maximizing efficient mechanism in (MMDP).
Proof. The proof is immediate from Proposition 5 and Proposition 8. 
Markov Ambiguity Sets
If the efficiency condition is relaxed, then the VCG mechanism is suboptimal for generic moment ambiguity sets. To show this, we will henceforth focus on Markov ambiguity sets with permutation symmetric support and first-order moment information of the form
where µ ∈ [0, 1]. The Markov ambiguity set stipulates that the bidder values range over the unit interval [0, 1] and are not smaller than µ in expectation. As the seller's revenue is non-decreasing in the bidder values, we could actually require E P [ṽ i ] = µ, i ∈ I, without affecting the objective function of problem (MMDP). We prefer to work with inequality constraints, however, to ensure that P admits a Slater point. Note also that, although the description of the Markov ambiguity set (14) is permutation symmetric, it contains distributions that are not symmetric.
It is instructive to investigate what would happen if the seller knew the bidder values from the outset. In this case, the seller's optimal strategy would be to give the good to the highest bidder and to charge him an amount equal to his value. In this manner, the seller could both maximize and appropriate the total social welfare. In other words, the seller could extract full surplus.
Definition 13 (Worst-Case Expected Full Surplus). The worst-case expected full surplus corresponding to an ambiguity set P is inf P∈P E P [max i∈Iṽi ].
The worst-case expected full surplus clearly provides an upper bound on the worst-case expected revenue the seller can obtain by implementing any ex-post individually rational and incentive compatible mechanism. This is because, by ex-post individual rationality, the seller cannot charge the winner more than his value.
Proposition 10. If P is a Markov ambiguity set of the form (14), then the worst-case expected full surplus is equal to µ.
Proof. Let δ µe be the Dirac point mass at µe. Since δ µe ∈ P, we have
and thus the claim follows. If µ = 1, then the Markov ambiguity set is a singleton that contains only the Dirac distribution at v = e. In this case, the seller can implement a second price auction without reserve price to extract the worst-case full surplus µ. On the other hand, if µ = 0, then the Dirac distribution at v = 0 is contained in the Markov ambiguity set. In this case, the worst-case expected revenue is 0 independent of the mechanism implemented. To exclude these trivial special cases, we will henceforth assume that µ ∈ (0, 1).
We now offer two equivalent reformulations of the worst-case expected revenues in (MMDP) when P is a Markov ambiguity set.
Proposition 11. If P is a Markov ambiguity set of the form (14) and µ ∈ (0, 1), then the objective function value of a fixed allocation rule q ∈ Q m-p in (MMDP) coincides with the (equal) optimal values of the primal and dual semi-infinite linear programs
and sup
By the definition of the Markov ambiguity set in (14), problem (15) can be represented as the generalized moment problem
The Lagrangian dual of this moment problem is given by the semi-infinite linear program (16).
Strong duality holds due to Proposition 3.4 in Shapiro (2001) , which is applicable because µ ∈ (0, 1).
Hence, problems (15) and (16) share the same optimal value.
Note that, by Proposition 11, two equivalent reformulations of problem (MMDP) are obtained by maximizing (15) or (16) over q ∈ Q m-p . Solving either of these problems yields an optimal allocation rule. The corresponding optimal payment rule can then be recovered from the first constraint in (MMDP).
The Optimal Second Price Auction with Reserve Price
Consider problem (MMDP) with a Markov ambiguity set of the form (14) with µ ∈ (0, 1), and assume for now that the seller aims to find the best second price auction (q sp , m sp ) with reserve price r ∈ [0, 1]. Recall that all second price auctions with reserve prices are indeed ex-post individually rational and incentive compatible and thus feasible in (MMDP), see Section 2.2 in Krishna (2009) .
As v i = 0 for all i ∈ I, it follows from Proposition 2(i) that
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We now calculate the worst-case expected revenue generated by a fixed second price auction (q sp , m sp ) with reserve price r ∈ [0, 1], which coincides with the (equal) optimal values of the problems (15) and (16) for q = q sp (see Proposition 11).
Assume first that r > µ. In this case, the worst-case expected revenue is 0, which is attained by the Dirac distribution at v = µe. Therefore, the seller will only consider reserve prices r ≤ µ.
The subsequent discussion is based on the following partition of the interval [0, µ] of all reasonable candidate reserve prices.
which ensures that R 1 ⊆ [0, µ] as desired.
We now show that the structure of the worst-case distribution in problem (15) depends on whether the reserve price belongs to R 1 , R 2 or R 3 . To this end, consider the semi-infinite constraint in the dual problem (16). By equation (17), the left-hand side of this constraint quantifies the total revenue in scenario v. On the other hand, the right-hand side represents a linear function of v.
The objective function of (16) tries to push this linear function upwards. At optimality, the linear function touches the total revenue function at a finite number of points in V. By complementary slackness, the support of the worst-case distribution that solves (15), if it exists, is confined to these discrete points. The following propositions provide explicit formulas for these extremal distributions and the corresponding worst-case expected revenues.
Proposition 12. If P is a Markov ambiguity set of the form (14) and µ ∈ (0, 1), then the worst-case expected revenue of a second price auction with reserve price r ∈ R 1 amounts to
and is attained by the extremal distribution
Figure 2 Complementary slackness between the distribution P in (15) and the semi-infinite constraint in (16) for two bidders and µ = 5 8
.
The atoms of the distribution Q (1) are visualized by the red dots in Figure 2a . Note that the worstcase expected revenue is independent of the reserve price r as long as r ∈ R 1 . This independence emerges because two opposite effects offset each other: When r increases, the probability of the scenario v = e, in which the seller earns the highest payments, decreases so that the expected value ofṽ i is preserved at µ. At the same time, the payments in all other scenarios increase due to the change in r.
Proposition 13. If P is a Markov ambiguity set of the form (14) and µ ∈ (0, 1), then the worst-case expected revenue of a second price auction with reserve price r ∈ R 2 is equal to
which is attained asymptotically by the sequence of distributions
The atoms of the distribution Q (2) (for close to 0) are visualized by the red dots in Figure 2b .
Note that the probabilities assigned to the scenarios e i + (r − )e −i , i ∈ I, are independent of the number of bidders. These scenarios each contribute an ex-post revenue of r. This explains why the worst-case expected revenue increases linearly in the number of bidders.
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The atoms of the distribution Q (3) (for close to 0) are indicated by the red dots in Figure 2c .
In this case, the worst-case expected revenue does not depend on the number of bidders because
is itself independent of the number of bidders.
We are now ready to determine the optimal reserve price as a function of µ and the number of bidders I. Recall from (18) that µ is always larger than or equal to I 2 is greater (smaller) than or equal to µ, the interval (0, 1) of possible mean values µ can be partitioned into the following disjoint subsets.
The intervals M 1 , M 2 and M 3 , and their relations to R 1 , R 2 and R 3 are visualized in Figure 3 .
If µ ∈ M 1 , then
is non-positive. Hence, R 1 is empty unless µ = 1 I
, in which case we have R 1 = {0}. Moreover, R 2 is nonempty and R 3 is empty. If µ ∈ M 2 , then
, which implies that R 1 , R 2 and R 3 are all nonempty. Finally, if µ ∈ M 3 , then
, in which case R 2 is empty while R 1 and R 3 are nonempty.
Theorem 8. Assume that P is a Markov ambiguity set of the form (14) with µ ∈ (0, 1), and let r and z denote the optimal reserve price and the corresponding worst-case expected revenue, respectively.
(ii) If µ ∈ M 3 , then any reserve price r ∈ R 1 is optimal and z = Iµ−1 I−1 .
Recall from Theorem 5 that a second price auction with reserve price is optimal in (MDP)
if P = {P} is a singleton, the bidders' values are independent and P is symmetric and regular.
Moreover, in this case, the optimal reserve price is independent of the number of bidders. In
Figure 3 Relation between R1, R2, R3 and M1, M2, M3.
contrast, Theorem 8 asserts that, for a Markov ambiguity set, the optimal reserve price depends on the number of bidders through the sets M 1 , M 2 and M 3 . Specifically, for µ ∈ M 1 ∪ M 2 , the optimal reserve price depends on µ but not on the number of bidders I. However, as I increases, M 3 will eventually cover µ, which results in a decrease of the optimal reserve price.
We close this section by proving that the second price auction without reserve price is asymptotically optimal in (MMDP) as the number of bidders tends to infinity.
Proposition 15. If P is a Markov ambiguity set of the form (14) with µ ∈ (0, 1), then for every > 0 there exists I ∈ N such that the second price auction without reserve price is -suboptimal in (MMDP) for all I ≥ I .
Proof. Fix any > 0 and select I ∈ N such that I µ−1 I −1 ≥ max{µ − , 0}. Thus, 0 ∈ R 1 whenever I ≥ I . This implies via Proposition 12 that the objective value of the second price auction without reserve price in (MMDP) is at least µ − for all I ≥ I . The claim then follows because the optimal value of (MMDP) is at most µ by Proposition 10.
The Optimal Highest-Bidder-Lottery
Consider again problem (MMDP) with a Markov ambiguity set of the form (14) with µ ∈ (0, 1).
Assume that the seller aims to optimize over all mechanisms in which only the highest bidder has a chance to win the good. Note that these mechanisms are not necessarily efficient because the seller can keep the good or assign the good to the highest bidder with some probability smaller than 1.
By Proposition 11, the mechanism design problem (MMDP) can thus be reformulated as
where the last constraint ensures that only the highest bidder (with respect to some prescribed tie-breaker) has a chance to win the good. Thus, we refer to the mechanisms feasible in (19) as highest-bidder-lotteries.
Theorem 9. Assume that P is a Markov ambiguity set of the form (14) with µ ∈ (0, 1), and set σ = −(W −1 (−µIe −I ) + 1) −1 , where W −1 denotes the lower branch of the Lambert-W function (Corless et al. 1996) . Moreover, set r = e (I−1− 1 σ ) , λ = −σ r and
Then, (q , σ e, λ ) is optimal in (19) with corresponding objective value r = e
By Proposition 2(i), we can construct a payment rule m from the allocation rule q by
One can show that the mechanism (q , m ) is an optimal highest-bidder-lottery in (MMDP).
The optimal allocation rule q is randomized and can be interpreted as follows. The highest bidder i earns the right to participate in a lottery, which allows him to win the object with probability
is decreasing in the second highest bid as long as both exceed r. It is perhaps surprising that the optimal allocation rule is randomized. As shown by Delage et al. (2016) , however, agents with maxmin preferences can derive substantial benefits from randomization when facing a discrete choice (such as choosing a buyer out of I bidders).
Proposition 16. As the number of bidders tends to infinity, the optimal highest-bidder-lottery (q , m ) converges uniformly to the second price auction without reserve price. Figure 4 compares the optimal highest-bidder-lottery against the best second price auction. Figure 4a shows the worst-case expected revenues generated by the optimal highest-bidder-lottery and the optimal second price auction with reserve price as a function of the number of bidders for µ = 0.5. The gap between them relative to the worst-case expected revenue of the optimal Optimal highest-bidder-lottery versus optimal second price auction.
highest-bidder-lottery is visualized in Figure 4b . We observe that the optimal highest-bidder-lottery generates substantially higher revenues when µ or I are small.
In Section 4 we have seen that if the bidders' values are independent and each distribution in the ambiguity set is symmetric and regular, then the added value of the optimal mechanism over a simple second price auction without reserve price is offset by just attracting one additional bidder.
We now demonstrate that this result ceases to hold if the bidders' values can be dependent, as is the case under some distributions in a Markov ambiguity set. To this end, we denote by ∆(I) ∈ N the least number of additional bidders needed by the best second price auction (which generates higher revenues than the second price auction without reserve price) to outperform the optimal highest-bidder-lottery with I bidders (which may be suboptimal in (MMDP)). Figure 5 shows that ∆(I) can be much larger than 1. In fact, we can even prove that there does not exist any finite upper bound on ∆(I) that holds uniformly across all I ∈ N.
Proposition 17. If µ ∈ (0, 1), then ∆(I) is unbounded.
Unlike q , the optimal payment rule m is deterministic, implying that the highest bidder has to make a payment even if he is unlucky in the lottery. That is, he is charged a fee for the right to participate in the lottery. In the following, we construct a new mechanism (q , m ) equivalent to (q , m ), where both the allocation rule and the payment rule are randomized, and which charges the highest bidder only if he actually receives the good. To this end, we assume that the seller has access to a randomization device which generates a uniformly distributed sampleũ from the interval [0, 1] that is independent ofṽ. Then, we define the new mechanism (q , m ) through Figure 5 The minimum number of additional bidders necessary to outperform the optimal highest-bidder-lottery with the best second price auction.
and and u ∈ [0, 1] . Note that both the allocation rule q and the payment rule m depend on the outcome u of the randomization device and are thus randomized. By construction, however the winner is not required to pay unless he receives the good in the lottery.
It is easy to verify that (q , m ) is equivalent to (q , m ). Indeed, we have
which implies that the expected revenues of the seller and the expected utilities of the bidders are identical under (q , m ) and (q , m ), irrespective of the value distribution P ∈ P.
Appendix. Proofs
Proof of Theorem 2. By Proposition 2(ii) and by the assumption that u i (v i , v −i ) = 0 for all i ∈ I and
Hence, the expected revenue of the seller with respect to some P ∈ P is equal to
where the second equality follows from (22). This indicates that the seller's expected revenue under any P is determined solely by the allocation rule q. Hence, the seller earns the same worst-case expected revenue from all mechanisms with identical allocation rules.
We need the following auxiliary result to prove Proposition 7.
Lemma 1. For each mechanism (q, m) feasible in (IMDP), there exists a mechanism (q , m ) with
that is also feasible in (IMDP) and results in a weakly higher worst-case expected revenue to the seller.
Proof. Construct (q , m ) by setting q = q and
Note that the ex-post utility under mechanism (q , m ) satisfies
for all i ∈ I, P ∈ P. Thus, (q , m ) satisfies the second constraint in (IMDP). Moreover, we have
which implies that (q , m ) satisfies also the first constraint in (IMDP).
We next show that (q , m ) results in a weakly higher worst-case expected revenue to the seller than (q, m).
As the ex-post utility satisfies
where the inequality holds because q = q and
for all i ∈ I and P ∈ P due to the second constraint in (IMDP). The statement now follows from the fact that right-hand side of this equation coincides with the objective function value of (q, m) in (IMDP).
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Proposition 2(ii) thus implies that the expected payment of bidder i under P can be expressed as
Using Fubini's theorem, we can re-write the second term as
Thus, the expected payment of bidder i under P simplifies to
where the equality holds because the bidders' values are independent.
Recalling the definition of the virtual valuation
we can now rewrite the objective function of (q, m) in (IMDP) as
Thus, the claim follows.
We need the following auxiliary results to prove Proposition 12.
Lemma 2. If r ∈ R 1 and P is a Markov ambiguity set of the form (14) with µ ∈ (0, 1), then Q (1) ∈ P and
Proof. Using the inequalities 0 ≤ r ≤ Iµ−1 I−1 < 1, which hold because r ∈ R 1 , one can show that the atoms of Q (1) have non-negative probabilities that add up to 1. Moreover, we have
This confirms that Q (1) ∈ P. A direct calculation further yields
Lemma 3. If r ∈ R 1 and P is a Markov ambiguity set of the form (14) with µ ∈ (0, 1), then σ 
If v i < r, we then have
where the first inequality holds because r ≤ 
where the first inequality exploits that v i ≤ 1. Finally, the objective value of (σ (1) , λ (1) ) in (16) amounts to
Proof of Proposition 12. The distribution Q (1) is feasible in (15) due to Lemma 2, and (σ (1) , λ (1) ) is feasible in (16) due to Lemma 3. Since the objective value of Q (1) in (15) is equal to the objective value of (σ (1) , λ (1) ) in the dual problem (16) (see Lemmas 2 and 3), Q (1) is optimal in (15) by weak duality, implying that the worst-case expected revenue amounts to
The proof of Proposition 13 requires the following auxiliary results.
Lemma 4. If r ∈ R 2 and P is a Markov ambiguity set of the form (14) with µ ∈ (0, 1), then Q (2) ∈ P for every sufficiently small > 0, and we have
Proof. One can show that the atoms of Q (2) have non-negative probabilities that add up to 1 for every
. Note that this upper bound on is strictly positive because r ∈ R 2 . Moreover, we have
This confirms that Q (2) ∈ P for every sufficiently small > 0.
Note that the i th bidder receives the good only in scenario v = e i + (r − )e −i , in which case he has to pay the reserve price r. Note also that all other bids are below r in this scenario. Thus, we find
This observation completes the proof. (2) and λ (2) , we can further rewrite the right-hand side of the semi-infinite constraint as
If v i < r, then we have
If v i ≥ r, on the other hand, note that
where the first equivalence holds because r ≤ 1 I . Hence, we obtain
where the second inequality holds because v i ≤ 1 and m i (v) = max{max j =i v j , r}.
Finally, the objective value of (σ (2) , λ (2) ) in problem (16) amounts to
Proof of Proposition 13. For every > 0 small enough, the discrete distribution Q (2) is feasible in (15) by Lemma 4, and (σ (2) , λ (2) ) is feasible in (16) by Lemma 5. Since the limiting objective value of the distributions Q (2) in (15) for ↓ 0 coincides with the objective value of (σ (2) , λ (2) ) in the dual problem (16) (see Lemmas 4 and 5), we conclude via weak duality that the distributions Q (2) , ↓ 0, are asymptotically optimal in (15), implying that the worst-case expected revenue amounts to Ir
To prove Proposition 14, we will need the following results.
Lemma 6. If r ∈ R 3 and P is a Markov ambiguity set of the form (14) with µ ∈ (0, 1), then Q (3) ∈ P for every > 0, and we have lim
Proof. One can show that the atoms of Q (3) have non-negative probabilities that add up to 1 because r ∈ R 3 implies that r ≤ µ < 1. Moreover, we have
This confirms that Q (3) ∈ P for every > 0.
Note that the good is allocated only if v = e, in which case the winner pays an amount equal to 1, that is, the second highest bid. Therefore, we find
This observation completes the proof.
Lemma 7. If r ∈ R 3 and P is a Markov ambiguity set of the form (14) with µ ∈ (0, 1), then σ , we can rewrite the right-hand side of the semi-infinite constraint as
If v i < r, then we find
If v i ≥ r, on the other hand, we have
where the first equivalence holds because r > 1 I , which implies that (1 − Ir) < 0. Hence, we have
Finally, the objective value of (σ (3) , λ (3) ) in problem (16) amounts to
Proof of Proposition 14. For every > 0, the discrete distribution Q We know from Proposition 13 that, for r ∈ R 2 , the worst-case expected revenue amounts to Ir
Thus, the worst-case expected revenue is strictly concave and maximized by r = 1 − √ 1 − µ. Note that r is indeed an element of R 2 and results in a worst-case expected revenue of
Assume next that µ ∈ M 2 . In this case, the sets R 1 , R 2 and R 3 are all nonempty. If r ∈ R 1 , by Proposition 12, the seller's worst-case expected revenue amounts to , which is a decreasing function of r because µ < 1. Hence, the highest possible worst-case expected revenue corresponding to any reserve price r ∈ R 3 is given by
, which is attained asymptotically as r tends to . Inside interval R 2 this function is concave and attains its maximum at r = 1 − √ 1 − µ, resulting in a worst-case expected revenue of
Hence, the seller obtains a worst-case expected revenue of I(1 − √ 1 − µ) 2 by imposing the optimal reserve
As for (ii), recall that R 2 is empty if µ ∈ M 3 . We already know that for r ∈ R 3 , the worst-case expected revenue amounts to µ−r 1−r which is decreasing in r and attains its maximum by imposing any reserve price r ∈ R 1 .
Before proving Theorem 9, we first show that (q , σ e, λ ) is feasible in problem (19). To this end, we need the following auxiliary result.
Lemma 8. For any fixed µ ∈ (0, 1), σ = −(W −1 (−µIe −I ) + 1) −1 is the unique solution of the equation 1 + σ Iσ e
in the interval (0,
), where W −1 denotes the lower branch of the Lambert-W function.
, and note that lim σ↓0 f (σ) = 0, which follows from L'Hôpital's rule, and that f (
Thus, for any µ ∈ (0, 1) the equation f (σ) = µ has a unique solution in the interval (0,
).
Equation (25) is equivalent to
where the first equivalence follows from the definition of the Lambert-W function (Corless et al. 1996) . As we are interested in finding a solution of (25) in the interval (0,
) and as the lower branch of the Lambert-W function is at most −1, we thus have that σ = −(W −1 (−µIe −I ) + 1) −1 .
Lemma 9. The solution (q , σ e, λ ) is feasible in problem (19).
Proof. Note that r ∈ [0, 1] because σ ∈ [0,
]. Note also that constraint (19c) trivially holds by the construction of q . Similarly, it is easy to see that q i (v) is non-decreasing in v i for every i ∈ I. Thus, we only have to show that the proposed solution satisfies constraint (19b) and that the elements of q (v) are non-negative and sum up to at most 1.
Select an arbitrary v ∈ V and assume without loss of generality that v ∈ V i so that bidder i is the winner.
We denote the second highest bid by v j = max j =i v j . Using the definitions of λ and the highest-bidderlottery allocation rule q , we can rewrite (19b) in scenario v as
In the remainder of the proof, we show that (q , σ e, λ ) satisfies (26), q (v) ≥ 0 and e q (v) ≤ 1 when scenario v satisfies the conditions in (20a), (20b) and (20c), respectively.
Case 1 (v j ≥ r): In this case, q i (v) is given by (20a). Using integration by parts, we can rewrite (26) as
The first equality holds because the allocation q i (x, v −i ) is of the form (20a) for all x ∈ [v j , v i ]. The last inequality holds as v j ≥ v j for all j = i.
Next, we prove that q j (v) ≥ 0 for all j ∈ I. By construction, we have q j (v) = 0 for all j = i. To prove that q i (v) ≥ 0, we observe that
where the inequality holds because σ ≥ 0, v i ≥ v j , and v j ≥ r.
To prove that the sum of the allocation probabilities is at most 1, we note that ] by Lemma 8, it is easy to see that the allocation probabilities are non-negative and their sum is at most 1.
Lemma 10. The objective value of (q , σ e, λ ) in problem (19) amounts to r. Recalling that λ = −σ r, the objective value of (q , σ e, λ ) in (19) can then be expressed as λ + j∈I σ µ = Iσ 1 + σ Iσ r − σ r = r, and thus the claim follows.
To prove Theorem 9, we first ignore the monotonicity condition on the allocation rule and show that (q , σ e, λ ) is an optimal solution to the relaxed problem (19) where Q m-p is replaced with Q. As q happens to be ex-post monotone, we may then conclude that this solution is also optimal in (19). One can verify that δ > 1 and 0 < ρ < 1 for small enough > 0. Figure 6 visualizes α .
We prove Theorem 10 together with Theorem 9. The proof relies on the following auxiliary results.
Lemma 12. The function α defined in (29) is feasible in (28) for every > 0 small enough. Therefore, the asymptotic objective value of α for small is given by lim ↓0 r δ (1 − ) + rρ = r because both δ and ρ converge to 1 as tends to 0.
We are now ready to prove Theorems 9 and 10.
Proof of Theorems 9 and 10. By Lemmas 9 and 10, (q , σ e, λ ) is feasible in (19) with the objective value r. By Lemmas 12 and 13, on the other hand, α is feasible in problem (28) and asymptotically attains the objective value r for ↓ 0. As (28) is the dual of a relaxation of (19) (obtained by replacing Q m-p with Q), it is a restriction of the dual of (19). Thus, α is a feasible solution in the dual of (19) that certifies via weak duality that (q , σ e, λ ) is optimal in (19). The corresponding worst-case expected revenue amounts to r = e (I−1− 1 σ ) .
Proof of Proposition 16. For the purpose of this proof we let σ (I) = − 1 W −1 (−µIe −I )+1 denote the value of σ from Theorem 9 for a fixed number of bidders I. We first show that Iσ (I) converges to 1 as I tends to infinity. Since −µIe −I drops to 0 as I grows, we obtain W −1 (−µIe −I ) = log(µIe −I ) − log(− log(µIe −I )) + o(1) = −I + log(µI) − log(− log(µI) + I) + o(1),
where the first equality follows from a well-known asymptotic expansion of the Lambert-W function (see Corless et al. 1996) . Thus, we have lim I→∞ Iσ (I) = lim I→∞ I I − log(µI) + log(− log(µI) + I) + o(1) = 1, which implies that σ (I) converges to 0 as I tends to infinity. By (20a)- (20d) and (21), it is immediate that the optimal highest-bidder-lottery (q , m ) converges uniformly to the second price auction without reserve price.
